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Best Practices for Irregular Warfare (IW) 
Data Quality Control 




• Irregular Warfare (IW)  
• Background 
– Physics-Based Combat Modeling 
– IW Modeling Validation Best Practices 
• IW Data Quality Control Research  
• IW Data Challenges 
• IW Data QC Best Practice Recommendations 
• Models, Complexity and Error: 




•  Irregular Warfare (IW) Model Validation Best Practices Guide (TRAC, 11 Nov 2011) 
•  Irregular Warfare (IW) Data Quality Best Practices Guide (TRAC, 31 Dec 2011) 
• DoD Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (DEC 2008) 
• DoD Instruction 5000.61 DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation, 
and Accreditation (VV&A) (DEC 2009) 
• Joint Pub 3-0 w/Change 1 (FEB 2008) 
• IW Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 (MAY 2010) 
• FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (DEC 2006) 
Irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. 
Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though 
it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in 
order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1-02)  
 
IW Definition 
Irregular Warfare (IW) 
US Department of Defense 
The focus of IW is the relevant populations, not the enemy’s military capability. 
3 
Background: 
Physics-Based Combat Modeling 
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Models, Complexity and Error 




AbramsTanks, Bradley IFVs, Paladin Howitzers 
Individual Infantrymen (identical) 
Individual Infantrymen (varying weapons) 
Mortars 
Raven and Shadow UAVs 
Anti-tank and Crew-Served Weapons 
Movement (Mobility models) 
Acquisition model (for shooter-sensors) 
Other Sensors (non-shooters: e.g Radars, Imaging, etc) 
Comms model (to link shooter-sensors) 
Non-Organic shooters (MRLs, ATK Helo, CAS, Naval Gunfire) 
The error of specification, εS, decreases as more of the systems in the BCT are represented.  
εS 
The Enemy! 
Models, Complexity and Error 




The error of measurement, εM, increases as each system added requires representational 
data and interactional data with many of the other systems (friendly and enemy). 
Need Terrain Data 
(now 2D+/3D-) 
Need Environmental/Atmospheric Data 
(Foliage, Obscurants, etc) 
Performance data for each individual system 




Need Environmental  
Data: Weather 
Need to account for Day/night  
(implications on human and weapon system capabilities) 
Need to account 
for range 
Models, Complexity and Error 
Example: Entity-level Modeling of a US Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 
7 
ERROR 
Fred Cameron suggested using the following paper that uses this rubric to describe economics, energy and environmental factors 




Total error: There exists a point ∂ where, beyond which, adding more 
detail to your model actually increases the overall error of the model.  
∂ 
New Capability: UAVs 
Human Dimension:  
Morale 
New Capability: Precision Munitions 
Human Dimension: Training 
Human Dimension: Fatigue 
Human Dimension:  
Combat Experience 
New Capability:  
Network-Centric Operations 
As we have added more detail to our legacy 
combat models, have we gone “beyond ∂” ? 
COMPLEXITY 
Physics-Based Cold War Legacy 
Ground Models 
• Attrition: 
– Strategic/Theater-level Models:  Processes incorporating 
modified Lanchester approaches for attrition. 
– Tactical level models:  Entity based models using variants 
of the ACQUIRE algorithm and performance data 
generated from engineering level models (SSPK, P(Hit), 
P(Kill/Hit), …) for attrition. 
• Purposes: 
– Force Structure 
– Force Design 
– Acquisition 
– Operational Planning & Assessments 
– Training 
– Test and Evaluation 
 
Assertion: As we got into the next-generation Physics-Based combat models, 
we started with existing attrition modeling as the foundation. 
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Background: 




Physics-based combat modeling vs. IW combat modeling 
Physics-based Modeling IW Modeling 
Referent is implicit in force-on-force combat 
modeling and adequate for underpinning models. 
It comes from the laws that we use to represent 
combat. 
Representation: Small combat unit force-on-
force lethal engagements. 
Conceptual Model: Describes the interactions 
that must be accounted for 
when two entities (e.g. a 
red and a blue tank) 
exchange fire. 
Referent: Laws of physics that 
represent target searching, 
target acquisition, and 
engagement of targets, 
accounting for lines of sight, 
weapons ballistics, and 
assessing damage.  
Representation: Specific multi-layered 
conflict ecosystem, to 
include interaction between 
population and combat 
actors. 
Conceptual Model: Describes the interaction 
(kinetic and non-kinetic) of 
actors (e.g. insurgents and 
counter-insurgent forces) 
with each other and civilian 
populace.  
Referent: Social science theories that 
account for human behavior 
interaction, laws of physics 
representing combat. 
Referent must be explicitly defined, accounting 
for how the actors will interact within the 
modeling environment. A far less familiar 
modeling domain. 
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The referent for our force-on-force combat models has been the laws of 
physics—social science model referents are typically theoretical. 
Validation Framework Concept Map 
“The Validation Triangle” 
Validation Framework Concept Map 
• Requirements 
– Develop specific functional 
or quality statements that 
can be directly and explicitly 
assessed to determine 
requirement. 
Having developers provide a detailed conceptual model, a referent that describes each social 
science theory that will be modeled (including alternate theories and why the candidate theory 
was chosen), and a description of the data that the model requires, and the source(s) of the data 
will be vital to producing a model that can be validated. 
• Acceptability Criteria 
– Develop a requirements 
traceability matrix relating 
each specified requirement 
with acceptability criteria 
applicable to the intended 
use.  
• User Needs 
– The developer needs to 
obtain a succinct and clear 
statement of the problem the 
M&S is expected to address.  
• Results 
– The acceptability criteria 
identify what the model 
needs to do to satisfy or 
meet the set of respective 
requirements pertinent to the 
intended use.  
• Executable Model 
– Design the model 
implementation to be as 
transparent as possible to 
permit analysis of execution 
paths and computed 
outcomes.  
• Conceptual Model 
– Develop the conceptual 
model using tools and 
techniques that create 
machine-readable 
specifications of the data and 
logic of the model. 
• Referent 
– identify the social science 
theory (or theories, if multiple 
competing theories will be 
represented in the model for 
comparison) that explains 
that phenomena.  
• Simuland 
– The simuland is the real-
world system of interest, 
including the objects, 
processes, or phenomena to 
be simulated. 
• Intended Use 
– Obtain a clear, succinct 
statement of intended use 
from the user 
representatives. 
• Data 
– The greater the specificity in 
the data requirements for a 
model, the greater the ability 
to collect the data needed to 
populate the model.  Modeling Best Practice: Validation starts 
before the first line of code is written!    
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Irregular Warfare Data Quality Control 
(versus ‘data validation’) 
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Problem Statement & Research Team 
(Work sponsored by OSD-CAPE & JDS through the IW-SCG) 
• In FY10, as follow on work to the IW Model Validation Best Practices Guide (TRAC, 11 
Nov 2011), JDS asked us to delve into “IW Data Validation.” 
• Task: “TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) will provide a report that assesses, at a 
minimum, the validation of IW data, to include an examination of data requirements, data 
sources, and data availability as well as derivation of data.” 
• Team:  
– MAJ Ricky Brown and MAJ Joe Vargas, TRAC-Monterey;  
– Dr. Jeff Appleget, Mr. Curt Blais, Dr. Mike Jaye, NPS;  
– Dr. Eric Weisel, Weisel Science & Technology Corporation. 
• Reviewers:  
– Mr. Howard Body and Dr. George Rose, [dstl]  
– Mr. Fred Cameron, CORA  
– Ms. Robin Griffen, Complex Operations Data Development Activity, TRAC-FLVN 
– Dr. Dean Hartley, Hartley Consulting  
– Mr. Don Hodge, AMSAA 
– Mr. Steve Stephens, MCCDC  
– Mr. Ed Weinberg, OSD-CAPE (contractor) 
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OSD-CAPE: Office of the Secretary of Defense - Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  
JDS: Joint Data Support  
IW-SCG: Irregular Warfare Senior Coordinating Group  
[dstl]: Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Ministry of Defence (MoD), United Kingdom 
CORA: Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Department of National Defence (DND), Canada 
AMSAA: Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
MCCDC: Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
Data Quality Control Not Well Defined 
• DoD policy1 references data indirectly 
– Models, simulations, and associated data used to support DoD processes, 
products, and decisions shall undergo verification and validation (V&V) 
throughout their lifecycles.  
– Models, simulations, and associated data used to support DoD processes, 
products, and decisions shall be accredited for an intended use. 
• A review of the available literature finds discussions of verification and 
validation to be focused almost exclusively on models and simulations.  
For the few papers where verification or validation of data is discussed, 
it is almost exclusively focused on numerical data.  
• The Army organization with the mission to provide systems 
performance data to M&S users, uses the term certification and not 
verification, validation, nor accreditation. 
During the conduct of our research, it was not apparent that DoD 
organizations understood verification, validation, and accreditation to be 
distinctly different and separable processes that were to be applied to data. 
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1. DODI 5000.61, 9 December 2009 
IW Data Challenges 
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IW Versus Physics-Based Data 
Representational Challenge 
In physics-based models, the underlying assumptions about how things work are well-
known and widely accepted. 
For most US Army and USMC physics-based models, AMSAA provides performance 
data that has undergone a QC process called “certification.”  
In the parts of IW models that represent the civilian population: 
• Many theories on individual and group behaviors exist. 
• Frequently, several different theories describe same phenomena. 
• Many proposed IW modeling efforts are not well-informed by social science 
theories or expertise. 
– Many IW modeling development teams list no social scientists as team members 
or even consultants. 
– Many IW modeling proposals do not cite any relevant social science theories or 
models to explain the foundation of their modeling concepts. 
• Simple Aggregation techniques do not apply to many social science disciplines 
– Complicated versus Complex systems. 
– Micro versus macro economics. 




What is more scientifically rigorous: 
a theory or a hypothesis? 
On Theories and Hypotheses… 
• A hypothesis is an educated guess, based on 
observation. Usually, a hypothesis can be supported or 
refuted through experimentation or more observation. A 
hypothesis can be disproven, but not proven to be true.  
• A scientific theory summarizes a hypothesis or group of 
hypotheses that have been supported with repeated 
testing. A theory is valid as long as there is no evidence 
to dispute it. Therefore, theories can be disproven. 
Basically, if evidence accumulates to support a 
hypothesis, then the hypothesis can become accepted 
as a good explanation of a phenomenon. One definition 
of a theory is to say it's an accepted hypothesis.  
 
 
By Anne Marie Helmenstine, Ph.D., About.com Guide 
“Repeated testing” implies to me that there should be a 
record of that testing. Could that record be called…data!?! 
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Additional IW Data Challenges… 
• Data Types: 
– Intangible 
– Transient  
– Non-numerical 
• Data Sources: 
– Non-DoD 
– Non-governmental 
– Dependent on Subject Matter Experts 
– ‘Pay to play’ 
• Data Responsibilities: 
– Responsibility for IW data has not been assigned 
18 















How is data developed for this? How do these 
data change over time? What are the threshold 
values to transition between states? Can you 
jump from “Supports” to “Tensions Exist” 
without ever being neutral?  
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* Example from [dstl], PSOM Yellowstone Scenario, but there are similar matrices in other IW models. 
Best Practice Recommendations 
20 
IW Data Quality Control Best Practices 
• DoD: 
– designates a single organization to serve 
as the IW Data Clearinghouse.  
– directs a rewrite of DoDI 5000.61 to clarify 
data management practices. 
• DoD organizations using IW Methods, 
Models, and Tools (MMTs): 
– certify the data used in the MMT as being 
“fit for purpose.”  
– document data sources, data 
development methodology, and data risk 
assessment. 
• DoD IW Data Clearinghouse: 
– specifies a standard metadata set for 
describing data supporting IW MMT.  
– maintains a repository of metadata for IW 
data sources used in DoD.  
– specifies and enforces data quality and 
data risk assessment entries for IW data 
sources catalogued in the IW metadata 
database.  
– coordinates the procurement of IW data 
from sources requiring formal 
agreements, usage restrictions, additional 
certifications, and/or fees for usage.  
 
– Provides a focal point for data reuse. 
 




– Puts the onus on the study directors to 
ensure the data is good enough. 
– Provides other DoD IW data users insight 
into what’s available, what it was used for, 
and the user’s quality assessment. 
 
– Provides DoD IW data users a standard 
format to document IW data sources. 
– Provides DoD IW data users a place to 
“shop” for IW data. 
– Allows DoD IW data users an 
understanding of the data’s quality. 
 
– Provides a focal point for the 
procurement and management of IW data. 
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Rationale for Best Practice Best Practice 
COMPLEXITY 
Models, Complexity and Error: 
Implications for Modeling Irregular Warfare 
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ERROR 




∂ εS: Must still specify a detailed environment, but the referents are 
social science theories instead of physics laws. 
εM: Because we’re dealing with human interactions, the data will 
not have nearly the same fidelity as our physics-based models. 
εT: Any modeling of Irregular Warfare, COIN, Stability Ops, Peace 
Support ops needs to be simple for it to be useful. 
Conclusion 
• IW Data Quality Control big challenge. 
• DoD has a big role to play. 
• Best Practices good start, but will morph as IW models 
mature. 
• Users of IW data must accept responsibility for the data 
they use.  
• There will be no equivalent AMSAA that provides the 
DoD IW data, at least not for the non-kinetic data 
requirements. 
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